U.S.S. TANG (SS 306) c/o Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California
SS 306/A16-3 Serial 09 May 15, 1944 CONFIDENTIAL
From: The Commanding Officer To : The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet Via : The Commander Submarine Division 141 The Commander Submarine Squadron 14 The Commander Submarine Force Pacific Fleet The Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet
Subject: U.S.S. TANG (SS 306), Report of War Patrol #2.
1. Enclosure (A), covering the second war patrol of this vessel conducted in areas northwest of Palau, east of Davao, and at TRUK, during the period 16 March 1944 to 15 May, 1944, is forwarded herewith.
R. H. O'KANE
(A) PROLOGUE
Returned from first patrol March third and completed refit on the eleventh.
As no difficulties were expected or experienced, post repair was combined with
two day and one night training period. Finished loading on the fifteenth, and
departed on second patrol at dawn March sixteenth.
(B) NARRATIVE
March 16 (12)
0655 Left Midway for Palau, proceeding at two engine speed.
March 17-22 (-12-11)
Enroute area conducting routine drills and dives.
March 23 (-11)
0512 Sighted trawler on patrol and avoided on the surface. Our position, 150
miles East of PAGAN Island, indicates that this vessel probably was a
spotter, and not fishing.
1235 Dived for half an hour on sighting an unidentified plane.
1712 Dived until dusk to avoid being sighted while passing between PAGAN and
ALAKAMGA Islands. Delayed an hour to insure peak radar operation while we
had land contacts available. In spite of the excellent wave meters and
other apparatus now provided for tuning this equipment there is nothing
like a good land contact to demonstrate its proper operation. Even the
experts concede this.
March 24 (-10)
0907 Changed course to north to intercept U.S.S. BARB's convoy.
1406 Dived for thirty minutes to avoid a patrol type aircraft.
1608 Dived for two SD contacts at ten miles.
1632 Surfaced and proceeded long reverse of expected convoy track until dark,
and then proceeded toward assigned area west of PALAU, as our orders will
not permit further delay.
March 25-26 (-9)
Enroute area.
March 27 (-9)
1651 Dived and avoided an unidentified aircraft.
2000 Entered area 10W, then proceeded to position sixty miles bearing 255d from
TOAGEL MLUNGUI pass, as assigned for strike on PALAU.
March 28 (-9)
On assigned station. Conducted submerged patrol as ordered, by searching
continuously with 17 feet of both periscopes, sound, and guarding 450 KC on
the SD mast.
March 29 (-9)
Patrolling submerged as on previous day.
1210 Sighted patrol type plane.
1823 Just prior to surfacing, sighted thin raked mast of a ship. Conducted
submerged approach at six knots until dark but could not close it
sufficiently to determine its identity.
1857 Surfaced, continued tracking, and took position ahead for moonlight
submerged observation and possible firing, although the "blurb" of the
target at 7000 yards seemed very small.
1950 Almost simultaneous with lightning flashes which revealed the target to be
a PA type patrol, six large planes in groups of two arrived on the scene.
They had on both running and landing lights and proceeded with what
appeared to be a routine submarine search. As we were in an unfortunate
position ahead of the first PC, which was later joined by a second, it
required two hours at periscope depth and finally deep submergence to get
clear.
March 30 (-9)
Conducted submerged patrol, searching with seventeen feet of periscopes.
1217 Heard a good explosion, followed by a second fifteen seconds later. As the
horizon was absolutely clear,
1227 surfaced for a better look.
1258 Sighted three planes, believed friendly, simultaneous with radar contact at
seven miles. Dived and continued submerged patrol.
March 31 (-9)
Patrolled submerged on assigned station.
0721 Sighted bomber, fairly close.
1700 sighted medium bomber on easterly course.
2232 Sighted two planes on the SD at about 16 miles which bothered us for half an hour as they conducted a search under the half moon. As the did not close inside eight miles, remained on the surface.
April 1 (-9)
0553 sighted a large plane on the horizon, dived and commenced usual high periscope submerged patrol for the day.
April 2 (-9)
0104 sighted flash over the horizon on bearing of PALAU, followed by apparent loom of searchlights. 0553 Commenced submerged high periscope patrol. 2000 Departed at one engine speed for newly assigned station 120-150 miles ease of DAVAO CITY, MINDINAO.
April 3 (-9)
0100 Passed to operation command of ComTaskFor Seventy-One. 0808 Dived for onehalf hour and apparently avoided detection by a patrol plane. 2400 Entered new area east of DAVAO GULF.
April 4 (-9)
Patrolled on surface in center of assigned area, searching with both periscopes, sound to detect echo ranging, and SJ during reduced visibility. 0347 Dived for three-quarters of an hour and apparently avoided detection by a plane sighted on SD at twelve miles.
April 5 (-9)
Searched on surface as on previous day. 1042 Dived for forty minutes and apparently avoided detection by a plane sighted on the horizon.
April 6 (-0)
Patrolling on surface. 2100 Departed area, proceeding ease at five knots on the auxiliary engine to conserve fuel. Our number 4 MBT could not be converted by Submarine Base, Midway, during the last refit.
April 7 (-9)
0752 Dived for twenty minutes and avoided plane sighted on horizon, then proceeded toward former area at five knots, searching as usual with everything we've got. 0900 Passed to operational command of ComTaskFor SEVENTEEN.
April 8 (-9)
Patrolling on the surface enroute newest area north west of PALAU. 0900 Commenced passing through a field of oil drums which continued throughout the day. 1500 SJ radar out of commission on afternoon test. The radar officer, radio technician, and leading radioman were relieved of all other duties and commenced "round the clock" repairs.
April 9 (-9)
0330 Sighted an unidentified plane which did not close, so continued on the surface. Numerous oil drums were again in sight all day.
April 10 (-9)
0058 Sighted plane on SD radar which closed to five miles before opening. 0813 Dived for forty minutes for a plane on SD at 8 miles. Apparently avoided detection due to overcast skies. 1017 Sighted single mast and deck house of an apparent PC type patrol boat. Dive and attempted to close to investigate, but height of eye range and change of bearing, when next observed form forty feet, showed him on a northeasterly course, at better than fifteen knots. and out of reach. As we were then about fifty miles from TOAGEL MLUNGUI pass, and expecting shipping within a day, continued on submerged to close the island undetected, but searching with 17 feet of periscope. It was a long haul from MINDINAO on the auxiliary engine, but other wise we would not have had sufficient fuel to complete the patrol.
April 11 (-9)
conducted submerged patrol ten miles west of NGARUANGL passage, with periodic high periscope searches. From this position we would have been able to intercept shipping through this passage or around VELASCO reef, headed for TOAGEL MLUNGUI, and at the same tine, been able to spot and trail for night attack any traffic from this latter pass. We considered this our first "likely spot" in nearly four weeks of patrol.
April 12 (-9)
As the TRIGGER was delayed in entering her lower half of area 10 NW, patrolled submerged five miles of TOAGEL MLUNGUI passage, covering her area as well as our own.
April 13 (-9)
Conducted submerged patrol between three and four miles off TOAGEL MLUNGUI. 1220 Sighted four motored flying boat which apparently landed in the lagoon. Repairs were completed to the SJ today, and it worked with peak performance on surfacing. As we have patrolled close in and enjoyed bright nights, it is doubtful that any shipping slipped by us, especially as TOAGEL MLUNGUI pass would hardly be used at night, unlighted.
April 14 (-9)
0154 Sighted U.S.S. TRIGGER on the SJ radar, as she crossed our area. Closed her and made preliminary arrangements for mutual assistance ion covering this area, and established sound communication for later use. Patrolled two miles off TOAGEL MLUNGUI during forenoon. 1400 As passing squalls developed into steady rain, surfaced, moved out to five miles from the pass, and conducted radar search. After dark, moved out to contact TRIGGER, but SJ failure prevented early rendezvous.
April 15 (-9)
0011 Sighted U.S.S. TRIGGER, and sent over the following by the tin can-line throwing gun method: (1) All new information we have concerning this area. (2) Our ideas for its most effective coverage by two submarines. (3) A duplicate copy of the coordinated attack doctrine and signals, for possible use. Received compatible ideas for coordinated patrol, and a report of TRIGGER's super convoy and her damage, for delivery to ComSubPac. Returned to TOAGEL MLUNGUI before dawn and conducted submerged patrol three or four miles off pass during the day. 1056 Sighted four engine flying boat. 1638 Sighted four engine bomber. 2152 Made rendezvous with TRIGGER who sent a rubber boat to TANG. Supplied her with compressor valves and cages, radar tubes, and our spare battery blower motor to use as a sound training motor.
April 16 (-9)
Patrolled submerged two to three miles off TOAGEL MLUNGUI. 0740 Sighted bomber. 1400 As TRIGGER was patrolling out today, proceeded southwest about three miles off the reef to investigate lower lagoon and western entrance to MALAKAL HARBOR. No evidence of any shipping could be detected. 1552 Sighted bomber over lagoon.
April 17 (-9)
Patrolled submerged three miles off TOAGEL MLUNGUI. 1215 Sighted large flying boat which apparently landed in lagoon.
April 18 (-9)
Patrolled submerged off TOAGEL MLUNGUI. 1013 Sighted flying boat over lagoon. 2130 Made rendezvous with TRIGGER. Sent over compressor valves to her and exchanged spare SJ modulator units in hopes of fixing our ailing SJ radar. Completed repairs during the night.
April 19 (-9)
Patrolled in same vicinity as on previous day, withdrawing as usual to the northwest during the night to insure a night radar run on any inbound convoy.
April 20 (-9)
Patrolled as on previous day. 0750 Sighted flying boat.
April 21 (-9)
Patrolled three miles off TOAGEL MLUNGUI. 0619 Sighted bomber on westerly course.
April 22 (-9)
0439 Sighted searchlight over the horizon in vicinity of harbor. 0504 Commenced submerged patrol closing to former position off TOAGEL MLUNGUI. 1143 Sighted five bombers flying south over the island. 1305 Sighted another bomber over lagoon headed west. 1440 Sighted flight of six bombers over the island. 2040 Departed for area fifteen to perform lifeguard services, proceeding at one engine speed. Though we regretted leaving this area without making our presence felt, our observations lead us to believe that it will remain stagnant for some time and that our route to TRUK will offer better chance of contact.
April 23 (-9)
Enroute TRUK at one engine speed, searching with both periscopes, sound to detect echo ranging, and SJ radar during passing squalls. 1840 In anticipation of bombarding the phosphorite refinery on FAIS Island the following evening, commenced firing seven rounds to determine the limiting point of twilight for accurate pointing and training, and t establish the ballistic to make the sight bar range equal radar range to the splashes.
April 24 (-9)
0600 As we were sufficiently ahead of schedule, changed course to close FAIS Island, forty miles north of our track. 1000 Dived fifteen miles from the island and closed at four knots. As we were aware of the reported gun emplacements, established the bearing line between lookout tower and refinery as 128dT, then proceeded around the island for bombardment by indirect fire. Surfaced in evening twilight with lookout tower, our point of aim, bearing 308dT, range 7300 yards, and 1828 commenced firing 33 rounds of four inch. To insure crossing the refinery, employed a rocking ladder of 200 and then 100 yard steps, and applied deflection spots as previously computed to include other structures in the installation. Though the results were not discernable, the shell detonations sere nicely visible at the bottom of the ladders and the target area was crossed several times. As expected, their guns, placed to protect the installation on the west side of the island, were unable to return any fire. 1845 Set course for new lifeguard station off TRUK at one engine speed.
April 25-26 (-10)
Enroute TRUK.
April 27 (-10)
0859 Dived for a six mile SD contact simultaneous with high periscope sighting of smoke to the southwest near HITCHFIELD BANK. On return to periscope depth eight minutes later, sighted the plane going away, and then the smoke from fifty feet. There were two patches tracked on a westerly course at about ten knots. Our attempts to "end around" before the enemy might reach GRAY FEATHER BANK were frustrated by the air coverage which drove us down five times before noon, the last with a "swish", perhaps of a dud bomb, and a rattle of machine gun bullets. Continued trailing for three more hours, but sighted not more smoke. The enemy was now an hour on the bank, and a hundred mile chase faced us with no assurance that we could guess where he would again strike deep water. Faced with this, and the problem of reaching our lifeguard station by the following day, regretfully set course for TRUK.
April 29 (-10)
0714 Dived on boarder of assigned area northwest of TRUK, and apparently avoided detection by a distant twin engine bomber. Continued high periscope submerged patrol throughout the day. 1522 Sighted distant plane on easterly course in direction of island. 1718 Sighted tow float planes. 1859 Shortly after surfacing dived for a six mile SD contact which closed slowly to two miles. Remained submerged for an hour.
April 29 (-10)
Continued submerged high periscope patrol, working around to lifeguard position east of TRUK for strike from MARSHALLS. 0550 Sighted float plane fairly close. 1928 About a half hour after surfacing commenced tracking attacking Liberators which passed seven miles north of us enroute TRUK, which was thirty miles distant. 1950 Observed several explosions in direction of island. 2000 Commenced diving at approximately one hour intervals to avoid a determined search of the area along our bearing from TRUK. As our bearing was 110dT from DUBLON, quite to the south of the track of Liberators returning to ENIWETOK or other MARSHALLS base, it was at once considered that this search was for us. Their search consisted of dropping increasing numbers of flares as the approached us from the island, employing three to four planes. The closest flares were about five miles distant. The plane contacts would continue to close to from three to four miles where they would fade out, most probably as the searchers came low to locate us by silhouette, for dead in the water we were probably invisible from overhead. Naturally we dived at this point for their search. After three such dives we moved out to forty miles from the island and were no longer troubled, although moonset may have caused them to fire up. It certainly appeared that the planes were vectored out along our bearing and that they did not know as distance from the island. Further, our distances checked with data concerning the DF'ing of the SD radar received subsequently.
April 30 (-10)
On surface in assigned position for carrier strikes on TRUK, 40 miles bearing 180d T from MOEN Island. 0400 Sighted strong radar interference on the SJ on mean bearing 240d T, obviously from our approaching task force. 0436 Sighted low flying plane or planes on SJ radar, which passed 4600 yards from us headed toward our task force. 0530 Sighted first planes on SD. 0610 Watched plane go down in flames over DUBLON Island. 0630 Dived for thirteen minutes and avoided a group of possibly unfriendly planes which closed rapidly to two miles. 0643 On surfacing, flights of up to fifty planes were continuously shuttling between TRUK and the southwest. With the possible exception of a sinking maru, this was the most encouraging sight we've witnessed in this war to date. 0815 Sighted tops, then superstructures of our task force. 1025 Received first report of downed plane and headed for reported position two miles off FOURUP Island at emergency speed. Bombers working over PALAU and OLLAN Islands were most reassuring, and with numerous fighters to guide us, locate the life raft promptly about four miles west of its reported position. 1156 With Lieutenant (junior grade) S. SCAMMELL, USN, J.D. GENDRON, AMM2c, and H.B. GEMMELL, ARM2c on board, withdrew six miles to the south. 1559 Proceeded at emergency speed on a course to round KUOP Islands to reach life raft outside reef on the east side of TRUK. Fifteen minutes later however a second raft was reported to the north of us in the approximate position of our first recover. As the latter could be reached during daylight, returned at emergency speed to this position two miles east of OLLAN and one mile off the reef. The hovering bomber and two fighters seemed perturbed that we wouldn't follow them over to the actual position, some five miles inside the reef. As a twenty minute search with periscopes and from atop the shears did not locate the raft, headed south again to carry out the original plan. All planes had now been recalled, leaving us a bit naked, so to avoid a prolonged submerged retirement, opened fire with 4" H.E. on the gun emplacements on the southwest end if OLLAN Island. Our ballistic of the previous week again proved correct, for with sight bar range 300 yards less than radar range, the first shell burst nicely low in the trees intended to conceal the emplacements. Fired twenty rounds of H.E. and common when retiring, quite agreeably amazed at the ability of the 4" to stay on the target. Corrected radar range fed continuously to the gun, with occasional salvos spotted short, appears a simple and adequate means of fire control. At 3500 yards trained in and turned tail, a bit prematurely, however, for the nips crawled out of their holes and let fly at us. Their first splash was about 1000 yards short, the second we didn't spot. Remained submerged for forty minutes, then surfaced and proceeded toward east side of TRUK at emergency speed. 2143 From position six miles ease of FEINIF Island on the eastern reef, commenced zigzag search to the southwest at ten knots. Fired green Very starts every fifteen minutes at the turns and midway of each leg, hoping for any sort of answer from one of the rafts. The only reply, sighted on some occasions, was a series of red or white lights in the neighborhood of UMAN Island, which changed bearing rapidly as if flashed along a runway. One of the pilots we recovered the following day had sighted our stars, but was afraid to answer them.
May 1 (-10)
0330 Proceeded east to a position for second day's strike, ten miles closer to the Island then on the previous day. 0340 Sighted radar interference of our task force. 0600 Sighted conning tower of jap submarine proceeding south around KUOP from OTTA pass. Submerged and commenced approach. Tracked him on straight course 180d at 12 knots. When the generated range was 3000 yards and angle on the bow 30 starboard, suddenly lost sound contact. Took a quick look to observe our bombers and fighters overhead and to confirm our fears that the enemy had dived. Dropped to 150 feet and rigged for silent running, by was unable to regain contact. Headed southwest for an hour at standard speed, then surfaced and proceeded to the northwest toward the reported raft of the evening before. Spread large colors on deck to help identify us, then reported enemy sub to the task force commander for possible attack. 0828 Headed at emergency speed for life raft reported two and a half miles southwest of our favorite OLLAN Island. Before we reached the scene, a float plane from the U.S.S. NORTH CAROLINA capsized in the cross chop in the attempt to rescue. The other NORTH CAROLINA plane made a precarious landing and on our arrival was towing both raft and fellow pilot clear of the island. This action was most helpful, for we expected competition from OLLAN, and nearby fighters were already strafing her gun emplacements for us. 0917 After lieutenant J.J. DOWDLE, USNR, Lieutenant (junior grade) R. KAUZE, for whom we had searched the night before, and R.E. HILL, ARM2c, were on board, and the second plane from the NORTH CAROLINA had somehow gotten into the air again, we proceeded to sink the capsized plane with 20mm fire. At this time a smoking torpedo bomber was spotted hitting the water about seven miles to the east. Proceeded down the bearing at emergency speed, and opened fire on nearby OLLAN as we passed. They had removed the trees intended to camouflage their position, evidently feeling it was no longer a secret. It gave us an unobstructed point of aim, however, and our hitting 4" H.E. with a few common sandwiched in, supported by strafing fighters and topped off with two bombers, must have discouraged them for they did not return any fire. 1004 Sighted life raft and survivors ahead under circling fighters. 1020 With Commander A.R. MATTER, USN, J.J. LENAHAN, ARM2c, and H.A. TOMPSON, ACM2c, on board, proceeded at emergency speed to round KUOP to reach three life rafts reported off the eastern reef. As our track took us close by our submarine contact of the morning, requested and promptly got air coverage. Blown high, with safety, negative and the fuel group dry, and even our Fairbanks-Morse smoking a bit, rolled through this spot at twenty- one knots fairly confident that the jap would get no more than a fleeting glimpse. As Lieut(jg) BURNS had landed his NORTH CAROLINA float plane off the eastern reef, requested that he attempt to tow the rafts clear. He was a big jump ahead of us however, having taken all seven men from three rafts 1328 on board and taxied with them to seaward. They were now in no immediate danger, so followed our escorting planes to a raft off MESEGON Island in the bight between KUOP and TRUK. As we thoroughly expected to be driven down, rigged a free running line and life ring to the SD mast for towing the raft clear while submerged, but our strafing escorts evidently discouraged any opposition. 1325 Recovered Lieutenant H.E. Hill, USNR, then headed for a fighter pilot reported in the water just off the eastern reef of KUOP. By the time of our arrival planes had dropped a rubber boat to him, but he was too weak to do more than climb aboard one. 1410 After pulling perhaps our most grateful passenger aboard, Lieutenant (junior grade) J.G. Cole, USNR, backed up wind clear of the reef and headed for the waiting float plane at emergency speed. She was well clear, about three miles east of SAEAT Island, and no difficulty was experienced in bringing the following on board: Lieutenant R.S. NELSON, USNR; Lieutenant (junior grade) R. BARBER, USNR; Lieutenant (junior grade) J.A. BURNS, USNR; Ensign C.L. FARRELL, USNR; J. LIVINGSTON, ARM1c; R.W. GRUEBEL, AMM2c; J. HRANEK, ARM2c; O.F. TABRUN, AMM2c; and R. HILL, ARM2c. The action of Lieut(jg) BURNS, in making the rescue possible by deliberately placing himself in as precarious a position as any of the downed personnel. will be made the subject of a special report. 1515 Sunk the float plane, which had a flooded battered tail, with 20mm fire, and proceeded at emergency speed to round KUOP to the last reported raft south of OLLAN Island. As all planes were recalled as of 1630, and we could not reach the raft until sunset, requested two night fighters to assist in locating it. Our passage through the area was of our morning contact was not quite as comfortable without air coverage, but again twenty-one knots took us through in a hurry. The night fighters joined us at sunset as we were approaching the las reported position three and a half miles south of OLLAN, and immediately commenced their search. Fifteen minutes later on of the fighters circled then fired several red Very stars four miles northwest of us. Closed at emergency speed, spotting the raft from atop the shears, as it was now too dark for periscopes. 1830 With Lieutenant D. KIRKPATRICK, USNR, and R.L. BENTLEY, AOM2c, on board, dismissed the planes and commenced slow speed search west of the atoll.
May 2 (-10)
Conducted submerged high periscope search off the western reef. 0955 Sighted flying boat over the lagoon. 1135 Sighted land plane near TOL Island. 1211 Sighted land plane in the west on a northerly course. 1220 Sighted probably same patrol on easterly course. 1605 Sighted unidentified aircraft in the northwest, headed for TRUK. 2005 Sighted A/A fire and explosions on TRUK from liberator raid.
May 3 (-10)
Searched as on previous day. 1725 Sighted float plane headed west.
May 4 (-10)
Conducted submerged high periscope patrol in most likely spot to intercept traffic for OTTA pass. Conducted search after dark, retiring to vicinity of OTTA pass for submerged patrol.
May 5 (-10)
Conducted submerged patrol off OTTA pass. 0615 Sighted float plane to the south. After dark proceeded outside forty mile circle to position east of DUBLON for Liberator strike on TRUK.
May 6 (-10)
0056 Several planes passed seven to twelve miles from us, tracked by SD radar. 0110 Sighted radar interference of U.S.S. PERMIT entering area. 0116 Observed explosions on bearing of DUBLON. 0200 Though all large plane contacts had disappeared, we were again bothered by searchers which maintained contact with us for another hour. We stopped and headed up moon streak when they came within five miles, and avoided the closest on at three miles on a rain squall., The three pips then moved out to seven and finally twelve miles, and then disappeared. 0300 With all planes departed and our relief in the area, set course for PEARL at two engine speed on prescribed routing. 0557 Three quarters of an hour after our trim dive, submerged for twenty minutes and avoided a float plane, probably searching from the HALL Islands, fifty miles distant. Had two plane contacts outside thirty miles during the remainder of the day. After dark, sent message concerning airmen aboard.
May 7 (-10)
Enroute PEARL. 0701 Tracked plane at forty miles on SD for some minutes. 0825 Dived for twenty minutes to avoid a large low flying plane. 1202 Tracked plane in from 14 miles. 1204 Though sighted and identified as a TBM at eight miles, dived as his approach was menacing. 1500 SJ radar out of commission on afternoon test. The last modulator unit, obtained form TRIGGER, has also leaked its oil. Commenced round the clock repairs. 1800 Held demonstration of all identification flares and stars (ex-smoke bombs) for the benefit of the aviators on board, none of whom had seen them before.
May 8 (-11)
Enroute PEARL.
May 9 (-11)
0513 In position 120 miles from WAKE, dived for plane sighted on the SD which closed rapidly from 10 to 7 miles. Though our position is nearly on a line between ENIEWETOK and WAKE, it is doubtful that a friendly plane would be hear at dawn. 1137 Sighted plane on SD which closed from 17 to 12 miles before opening. 1300 Slowed to one engine to conserve fuel.
(C) WEATHER
The weather was normal for the areas and periods covered.
(D) TIDAL INFORMATION
The tidal conditions were normal.
(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS
None sighted.
(F) SHIP CONTACTS
See charts.
(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS
See charts.
(H) ATTACK DATA
No attacks.
(I) MINES
None observed.
(J) ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS
Extensive use of aircraft was bothersome day and night. It is not believed that any were radar equipped, but some were obviously searching along our bearing from TRUK as noted in the narrative, most probably as a result of DF'ing our SD. Off PALAU a combined aircraft and surface search was encountered which was avoided at deep submergence below a 26 degree gradient.
(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE
None. SHIP CONTACTS
No. Date Time Lat. Long Type Range Cse Spd How Remarks --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 3/23/44 0512 18-40N 148-30N Fishing 5000 var Un Sight Evaded on Patrol Surface ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 2 3/29/44 1823 7-10N 133-35E Patrols 14000 090 8 Per. Tracked then 2 evaded ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 3 4/10/44 1030 8-25N 134-05E Patrol 20000 13 Per D1sappeared surf over horizon ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 4 4/27/44 0900 6-50N 148-50E Smoke 30000 270 10 Per Forced down 5 surf times by air contact ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 5 5/1/44 0800 7-10N 151-45E Sub RO 14000 180 12 Per Sub dived for Class surf our planes ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AIRCRAFT CONTACTS
No Date Time Long. Lat. Type Range Crse Alt How Sighted 1 3/23/44 1235 18-15n 147-00e Unknown 10 mi 1000 ft Sight ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 3/24/44 1406 17-37N 143-45E Patrol 10 mi 140T 1000 ft Sight ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3 3/24/44 1608 18-03N 143-41E Not 10 mi Radar sighted ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4 3/27/44 1651 09-030N 133-05E Unknown 5 mi 045T Sight ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5 3/29/44 1210 07-21N 133-24E Patrol 8 mi 050T 1000 ft Periscope ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6 3/29/44 1950 7-10N 133-40E Unknown Various Running lts ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7 3/30/44 1258 7-18N 133-31E Unknown 7 mi 135T Radar & Sight ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8 3/31/44 0721 7-13N 133-08E Twin Tail 2 mi 070T 200 ft Periscope Twin Eng. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9 3/31/44 1700 7-13N 133-08E Medium 6 mi 090T 500 ft Periscope Bomber 2 Eng. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10 3/31/44 2230 7-16N 133-31E 17 mi SD -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11 4/1/44 0553 7-20N 133-42E Medium 7 mi 095T 1000 ft Bridge Lookout Bomber 2 Eng. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12 4/3/44 0308 7-17N 131-28E Float 8 mi 121T 900 ft Bridge Lookout Type -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 13 4/4/44 0847 7-41N 127-41E Radar 12 mi SD Cont. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 14 4/4/44 1427 7-41N 127-41E Flying 4 mi 200 ft Sight Boat -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 15 4/5/44 1042 6-42N 127-45E Unident 9 mi Sight -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 16 4/10/44 0058 6-40N 133-35E Unident 6 mi Radar -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 17 4/10/44 0813 8-35N 134-00E Unident 8 mi Radar -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 18 4/13/44 1220 7-39N 134-24E Flying 14 mi 130T 500 ft Periscope Boat -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 19 4/15/44 1056 7-38N 134-25E Flying 3 mi 160T Periscope Boat -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 20 4/15/44 1638 7-38N 134-25E Bomber 3 mi 150T 1000 ft Periscope --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NO. DATE TIME LAT LONG TYPE RANGE COURSE ALT HOW REMARKS SIGHTED 21 4/16/44 0640 7-36N 134-23E Bomber 3 mi 270 T 1000' Periscope Outbnd
23 4/17/44 1215 7-34N 134-23E 6 mi 6 mi Circ. 500' Periscope Inbound for landing 24 4/18/44 1015 7-39N 134- 2 motor 7 mi Circ. 1000' Periscope Inbound 256E flying for down boat landing
25 4/22/44 0620 7-43N 134-20E 2 eng. 6 mi 070 T 800' lookout Twin bomber tail
26 4/22/44 1145 7-38N 134-24E " 7 mi 190 T 800' Periscope 5 in form.
27 4/22/44 1305 7-36N 134-25E land 4 mi 230 T 900' Periscope bomber 28 4/22/44 1340 7-36N 134-25E 6 20 mi 100 T 1050' Periscope 6 in bombers form.
31 4/27/44 0900 6-50N 146-50E fighter 6 mi 220 1000' SD Periscope 32 4/28/44 0705 6-55N 151-05E bomber 15 mi north lookout
33 4/28/44 1521 6-55N 151-05E flying 20 mi Periscope boat
34 4/28/44 1537 " " " " " Possib.
35 4/28/44 1718 6-55N 151-05E sea 1 mi south 800' Periscope plane 36 4/29/44 0550 6-50E 156-00E " 1/2 500' Periscope mi
37 4/29/44 1900 7-08N 152-07E many 2-14 Radar Many 2400 unident mi planes
38 4/30/44 All 6-50N 151-52E Many Radar Many day sight planes
39 5/1/44 All 6-50N 151-52E Many 0-14 " day mi 40 5/2/44 1000 7-15N 152-35E flying 6 mi 120 T Periscope boat
41 5/2/44 7-15N 152-35E Zeke 3 mi Periscope
NO. DATE TIME LONG LAT. TYPE RANGE COURSE ALT. HOW REMARKS SIGHTED 42 5/2/44 1605 7-10N 151-20E SB 12 mi 090 T 1000' Periscope Enterng Truk
43 5/3/44 1725 7-20N 151-20E Recc 10 mi 270 T 1000' Periscope Similar to SOC3
44 5/4/44 1030 7-05N 150-28E Unident 7 mi 090 T 500' Sight 45 5/5/44 0615 7-08N 151-45E Recc 10 mi 225 T 1500' Periscope SOC3 SO type
46 5/6/44 0100 7-45N 152-35E 15 mi Radar Many
47 5/6/44 0355 8-40N 153-00E Dave 12 mi 90 2000' Sight
48 5/7/44 0000 12-50 156-10 15 mi 200 1000' Sight 49 5/7/44 0820 12-55N 156-30E 8 mi low Sight Dove to 150'
50 5/7/44 1205 13-25N 156-45E PBM 11 mi High SD Sight Avoided
51 5/9/44 0512 17-47N 166-30E 7 mi SD Dove to 150'
(L) COMMUNICATION
Radio reception was good and no difficulty was experienced in any transmissions. Of special note was the very satisfactory two way voice communication during the strike on TRUK in part due to the wardroom Hallicrafter receiver. The frequency of 4475 could be answered by all planes and had the advantage of being clear of their VHF tactical frequency. It was therefore possible for planes to direct us quickly, and for us to get their support when needed. Voice on the RL receiver was quite often unintelligible.
(M) RADAR
The performance of the SJ radar was very satisfactory when it was in operation. Fortunately its off periods in general coincided with bright nights when shipping could be sighted and to the return trip. The trouble was generally in the new type transmitter and among other things entailed the failure of the original modulator unit, the spare, and finally a third one obtained from the USS TRIGGER. Around the clock repairs by our "long course" radar officer, a first class radio technician, and a first class radioman could only temporarily overcome the rate of breakdown. A thousand man hours were devoted exclusively to its overhaul with only temporary results and the knowledge that "they hadn't said uncle" as a reward. The details of the failures are listed below:
Item Number of Reason for Number Description failures failure
135 VR-150/30 Tube 2 Lost gas 120 6L6 (metal) Tube 4 shorted and weak 121 6L6 (glass) Tube 1 poor emission 134 VR-105/30 Tube 1 lost gas 140 919 LP Lamps 4 Poor regulation 117 6AC7 Tube 4 shorting and poor emission
122 6SN7 Tube 2 poor emission 118 6AG7 Tube 1 shorting 127 705A Tube 3 not known 116 504G Tube 5 shorting and poor emission 129 717A Tube 2 soft 119 6H6 (glass) Tube 1 shorted 114 2X2 Tube 1 lost emission 135A 5D21 Tube 1 gasious 133 836 Tube 1 shorted 137 5HP1 (cathode ray) 2 not known & one accidently broken 128 706AY Magnatron 2 low R. F. 97 Voltmeter 1 shorted out 104 Renewal links for 6 amp fused 32 overload 106 Renewal links for 10 amp fuses 18 overload 213 capacitor, mica 240 mf 500 volts 1 not within tolerance 236 Cable assem. coax 1 arching 242 Modulation network 3 leaking oil 281 Resistor, .18 megs 1/2 watt 1 open 349 Resistor, .15 megs 2 watts 1 burned out 350 Resistor, 1 meg 2 watts 1 not within tolerance 361 Resistor 100 ohms 2 watts 1 added to set 366 Resistor 10,000 ohms wire wound 1 open 363 Resistor 1600 ohms Wire sound 1 burned out 411 Resistor 10,000 ohms 2 watts 1 below tolerance rating 444 Resistor, 7 megs 10 watts 1 not within tolerance 342 Resistor, 2200 ohms 2 watts 1 burned out 410 Resistor 10,000 ohms 2 watts 1 open 185 Capacitor, .5 mf 600 volts 1 leakage 148 Capacitor, .1/.1 mf 600 volts 1 leakage
SJ-1 M.G.
19 Resistor, Designation 5895405AB1 1 open 20 Resistor, Designation 5895405AB2 1 damaged during repairs 25 Brushes, Designation 8109931AA4 4 worn out 27 Rotating elements Designation 8109978AC1 1 worn out
(N) SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS
Normal.
(O) DENSITY LAYERS
None observed that have not been previously reported by other submarines.
(P) HEALTH, FOOD, AND HABITABILITY
Good.
(Q) PERSONNEL
(a) Men on board during patrol------------72 (b) Men qualified at start of patrol------24 (c) Men qualified at end of patrol--------59 (d) Men unqualified making first patrol--- 6 (e) Men advanced in rating----------------18
On Station 2,600 27,000 Enroute Pearl 3,100 30,000
TOTAL 11,150 96,500
(S) DURATION
Days enroute Palau--------------------------11 Days enroute Davao-------------------------- 1 1/2 Days returning Palau------------------------ 3 Days enroute Truk--------------------------- 5 1/2 Days in area--------------------------------29 Days enroute Pearl--------------------------10 TOTAL 60
Days submerged------------------------------24
(T) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING
Torpedoes Fuel Provisions Personnel Factor 24 2,000 15 days Unlimited
(U) REMARKS
IDENTIFICATION:
The twenty tow aviators who witnessed a demonstration of submarine identification flares Mk 10, 11, and 12, submarine emergency identification signals Mk 2 Mod 2 (ex-smoke bombs), and Mk 1 comets (Buck Rogers gun), unanimously doubt their ability to note any but the Mk 1 comet, and that one too if already diving for an attack. Along this same line is the fact that every pyrotechnic we could fire did not deter a friendly submarine from making as end around on us during our last patrol forcing us to avoid at high speed as soon as he dived. Sure identification is becoming increasingly important as we traverse a thousand extra miles of U.S. patrolled waters. Further, it may not always be possible or desirable to establish sanctuaries in coming operations, such an incident arising in this very patrol when an enemy submarine shared our area for a day or more. Means for reliable identification is at hand in the simple Mk 3 (mortar type) signal projector which was issued to submarines during 1938, but ordered turned in before many were installed. The order to turn them in was based on the fact that the submerged signal gun could fire pyrotechnics of similar color. The person issuing the order evidently did not consider the prohibitive delay in the use of the submerged gun for a surface projector. The Mk 3 projector mentioned above provides a healthy pyrotechnic where it can be seen in a matter of a second or two, and its effectiveness was demonstrated on one of our submarines who reinstalled one prior to returning to the coast after her first patrol. It successfully warded off numerous army planes, certainly the crucial test. It is our present intention to procure one, at least for demonstration during the training period.
The fact that one of the pilots later recovered observed our green Very stars during our night search east of TRUK but was afraid to answer, indicates the need for a simple identification under these circumstances Rather than reverting to any complicated arrangement using a two or three color cartridge, especially as there is no advantage in having the submarine signal visible at a greater range the that from the raft, the following procedure is suggested as standard. If accepted and publicized among aviators, it could well facilitate some rescues: (a) Submarine fire single green stars during night searches as conditions permit. (b) Raft reply with one of the five or six red stars with which each is now provided. (c) Submarine on sighting red star immediately reply with green stars and close the bearing, firing additional stars as necessary.
NIGHT PERISCOPE
In agreement with the U.S.S. SEAHORSE, it is hoped that the night periscope is not being held up by design difficulties of the radar feature. The periscope itself will eliminate that "between the dark and the moonlight" period when the proper attack is near impossible. This is nine tenths of what is desired. Though the radar feature is very desirable, the ability to see the target group at considerable range will permit an aggressive submerged approach with firing ranges that will insure the hits.
SUBMARINE RADAR
It was most disappointing to learn that the proposed aircraft search radar had been abandoned in favor of improvements to the present SD. The sixty of the "bed spring" and the 60 degree overhead void were evidently the main objections. The objection by commanding officers to the moderated size antenna is inconsistent, for there is hardly a submarine whose shears do not bulge with underwater loops, CUO antennas, lookout platforms, binocular rests, and "clear the bridge" poles. Further, the proposed antenna could doubtless be designed to fold automatically in the manor of a music stand. The sixty degree blank cone overhead, which at first appears frightening, could well be given a little more thought. Personal conversation with Commander Bernstein las summer indicated that this radar would be infallible in detecting planes up to twelve miles. In other words, unless the enemy were coming from Mars, he would have to by flying at approximately 50,000 feet to escape detection. Except in radar equipped planes, airmen admit that they'll probably not spot a submarine when flying above 15,000 feet, and will surely not detect him under the best condition s when above 25,000 feet. Thus the proposed radar seem to offer a substantial safety factor. Overlooking the above, the weakness of the present SD is not in its very few internal failures, but in its unpredictable voids, its inability to detect low flying planes, and the obvious east with which the enemy is DF'ing and perhaps homing on it. Granting that any radar equipment must be accepted with its limitations, the enemy is not standing still, and the limitation of the SD may before long preclude its general use. A static program of only improving present equipment is therefor unsound and should be avoided. A farsighted program would include addition of the proposed aircraft search radar, with improvements to the present SD. If below deck space is a problem in this installation, there is a ships office any boat would donate. If it is topside space, a permanent feeder running topside inside or outside the conning tower, thence between periscope shears to fixed SD radiators at shear top level would leave the after space available for a "bed spring" aircraft search radar.
Except for internal failures, which will undoubtedly be ironed out by installation of more substantial parts, the SJ at present is a near ideal search and attack radar. We are, however, accepting a reduced range simply because of the relatively low height of the reflector compared to the much similar SG installations in surface craft. In addition to the greater area that could be covered with a higher reflector, is the probable necessity of tracking the enemy at greater ranges as his radar improves. The design problems of a raisable reflector are not insurmountable. One could and should be designed to operate at the height of our raised periscopes. The most logical way to accomplish this would be first to install the new aircraft detection radar in the place now occupied by the SJ and move the SJ to the top of the present SD mast. By removing the SD housing pipe, in the conning tower, and installing a well, the present hoist could raise this mast to the desired level. A clutch type coupling, similar to our original periscope bearing transmitter coupling, would provide a ready means for power rotation to the mast in its raised or lowered positions. The wave guide could be telescopic, with transmitter output fed to it near the bottom of the well. It the present reflector is too heavy, a metal sprayed plastic one could be substituted.
The minimum we should now be striving for is then two position SJ, an airplane search radar to augment the SD, and the coming periscope radar. Though the above opinions and ideas may seem too futuristic, it must be remembered again that the enemy is not sitting still. We are still enjoying, though on the waning edge, an immense tactical advantage over him because of speed and radar. However the minute we say "this is good enough" we're losing the offensive and he is catching up. It would then be just a matter of time until submarines are again the "submerged vessels of opportunity" we used to believe them to be.
SUBMARINE DIVISION FORTY-FOUR FB5-44/A16-3
Serial (039) In Care of Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California, 21 May 1944.
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
FIRST ENDORSEMENT to U.S.S. TANG Second War Patrol Report
From: The Commander Submarine Division FORTY-FOUR. To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet. (1) The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR. (2) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet. (3) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. TANG Second War Patrol - comments on.
1. Although disappointing in that no shipping loss was incurred by the enemy, the second war patrol for the TANG under Lieutenant Commander R. H. O'Kane as commanding officer was equally as outstanding as his first. By virtue of remarkable cooperation with aircraft of the U.S. striking force attacking TRUK, willingness to proceed from point to point within gun range of shore batteries in order to rescue expeditiously personnel of downed aircraft, and seizing the initiative by bombarding known gun emplacements when passing OLLAN Island, twenty-two U.S. naval aviation personnel were rescued from lifeboats and downed aircraft. During the sixty day patrol, twenty-nine days were spent on assigned stations in Palau, Davao and Truk areas, No doubt the scarcity of targets is attributable in part to the presence of a heavy U.S. task force in the western Pacific.
2. Of five surface craft contacts three were small patrol craft and evaded, one was an RO class submarine which dived at a range of 3000 yards on appearance of U.S. aircraft, and one smoke contact of two ships. It was impossible to close this contact because of combination of air screen attacks, proximity to shoal water on Grey Feather Bank and operation order to take a lifeguard station. Of fifty aircraft contacts, twenty-two were sighted by periscope, eight were observed first by radar while four were made jointly by radar and sight, fifteen were seen by bridge personnel during daylight and one was discovered at night due to carrying running lights.
3. The performance of the SJ radar can not be classed as completely satisfactory due to the excessive time under repair and the abnormal quantity of spares required for maintenance. The comments of the commanding officer on the general subject of radar are well taken; the use of both the SD and SJ radar must be supervised carefully to prevent aiding the enemy in counter measures. Until such time as radar equipment non-susceptible of enemy detection, is available again to submarines, it will be necessary to utilize other equipment, primarily sound gear, to obtain data provided previously by radar. Periscope radar is required more now than a year ago.
4. With the number of submarines being used on lifeguard stations and the morale effect on aviators participating in such raids, it is felt that a certain means of ready identification between submarines and the aviation personnel is essential. Good voice communication between planes and submarines is required. Air coverage of lifeguard submarines permits freedom of action by the submarines in moving from point to point in effecting rescues.
5. Health and morale of TANG personnel was excellent. It is noteworthy that thirty-five men were qualified in submarines during this patrol, while eighteen out of a total of seventy-two on board were advanced in rating. The TANG will undergo normal refit by Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor with particular attention being paid to radar equipment, and conversion of number four main ballast tank into fuel ballast tank.
6. The commanding officer, officers and crew are congratulated on the rescue of twenty-two officers and men of the naval aviation service.
E. R. SWINBURNE
SUBMARINE DIVISION FOUR
FC5-4/A16-3
Serial 0195 Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
U.S.S. TANG Second War
Patrol Report
From: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
(1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
(2) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. TANG Second War Patrol - comments on.
1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of Commander Submarine Division
FORTY-FOUR.
2. The lifeguard methods employed by the Commanding Officer, U.S.S. TANG,
coupled with his remarks on this type of operation have been made a basis for
training potential "lifeguards".
3. Commander Submarine squadron FOUR adds his congratulations to those of
the entire service for the outstanding seamanship, tenacity and courage
displayed by the Commanding Officer, officers and crew of the U.S.S. TANG.
C. B. MOMSEN
SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET
FF12-10/A16-3(15)/(16)
Serial 01028 In Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
27 May 1944.
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
FIRST ENDORSEMENT to NOTE: THIS REPORT WILL BE
U.S.S. TANG Second War DESTROYED PRIOR TO
Patrol Report ENTERING PATROL AREA.
COMSUBPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 426
U.S.S. TANG - SECOND WAR PATROL.
From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. TANG (SS306) - Report of Second War Patrol.
(16 March to 15 May 1944).
1. The TANG's second war patrol was conducted in areas northwest of
Palau, east of Dravao, and the vicinity of Truk.
2. This entire patrol was outstanding in patrol efficiency, excellent
initiative, and aggressive spirit. Throughout the patrol the TANG used all of
its equipment to the utmost efficiency.
3. The remarkable recovery of 22 Naval aviators in seven different pick-
ups close to the reef at Truk and within enemy gun range is a sterling example
of how cooperation between the submarine performing lifeguard duty and planes of
the striking air forces can, by cooperation, make successful recoveries of our
downed aviators. The aggressive, successful, and well planned bombardment of
Ollan Island contributed much to the eventual rescue of the downed aviators.
This patrol report should be carefully studied by all Commanding officers as a
guide for future lifeguard duty.
4. It is of note that the TANG's contact with the TRIGGER and subsequent
exchange of necessary spare parts was instrumental in the latter vessel
continuing on a patrol that inflicted severe damage to the enemy.
5. The remarks made by the Commanding Officer regarding the present and
future uses of radar by submarine s are greatly appreciated. The Pro-Sub
section in This area and in the Department are constantly working on all new
developments including radar.
6. This patrol is designated as successful for Combat Insignia Award.
7. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the
Commanding Officer, officers and crew for the aggressive and efficient manner in
which the lifeguard duty was performed resulting in the recovery of 22 Naval
aviators.
C. A. LOCKWOOD, Jr.
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